Introduction
In recent years quite a lot of research effort has been dedicated to successive ap~roximations methods in Markov decision processes and Markov games for the total expected reward as well as for the average reward criterion. In this paper we only consider the total expected reward criterion. The reasons for this attention are both theoretical and numerical. It appeared that from the theoretical point of view the successive approximations approach gives a basic understanding of the processes involved. From the numerical point of view, it turned out that the more sophisticated methods like policy iteration and linear programming are not suitable for very large problems. Furthermore, it appeared that the policy iteration method and therefore the strongly related (see e.g. [21J, [46J) linear programming approach,is essentially an ~ extreme example of a successive approximations method (see section 5).
• In this paper we will give a review of recent developments with regard to successive approximations for Markov decision processes and Markov games with the total expected reward criterion. First we will be concerned with the conditions under which successive approximations converge, in some uniform sense, to the value of the decision problem (section 2). In section 3 we investigate these conditions further. For the sake of simplicity we initially treat the whole theory for Markov decision problems only and consider the extensions to Markov games later on (section 7).
Essential for our conditions is that unbounded rewards are to a certain extent allowed. Furthermore, we do not require strict discounting. Actually-as will appear in section 2 and will be worked out further in section 3 -our conditions give a joint restriction on the allowed unboundedness of the rewards and the drift/fading of the system (or equivalently: the uniformity of discounting). With our conditions we combine the shift approach of Harrison [5J with the weighted supremum norm approach of Wessels [43J. For countable state space and arbitrary action space this combination has been presented first by van Nunen in his monograph [22J. A slight generalization has been given by the present authors in [25J. A generalization to more general state spaces has been given by Couwenbergh in [2J and [3J. In order to avoid measure theoretic and topological complexities, we will only treat the countable state space situation in this paper.
Besides the conditions for convergence of successive approximations, we will also be concerned with ways to diminish the amount of work required for the computation of good strategies and good estimates of the value function.
We will present essentially four work saving ideas. The first one already appears in section 2 and consists of using the subsequent approximations for the construction of upper and lower bounds. Compared with the conventional estimates (using only the geometric convergence rate), these generalizations of the Mac Queen-bounds [19J accelerate the convergence considerably, without requiring more work per iteration step. The second device which can be used in order to accelerate convergence is an alternative policy improvement step which can be defined with a stopping time. In section 4 it is shown how different stopping times generate different successive approximation methods. This stopping time approach has been presented first ~ in [44J and has been generalized and refined in [22J; [26J gives a short overview together with some new points of view. In section 5 it is demonstrated how all these successive approximation methods can be refined by the introduction of a better value estimation for the current policy in each iteration step. Here all types of policy iteration methods appear to be extreme cases of successive approximations procedures. This value oriented approach has been introduced in [23J, generalized in [27J , and further generalized in [22J, see also [26J. There is still one other idea to exploit (section 6), viz. the elimination Qf suboptimal actions. In [20J MacQueen used his upper and lower estimates for the value function for the detection of actions which cannot be optimal. Namely, in each iteration step some actions may be eliminated resulting in less work during the remaining iteration steps. This idea can be adopted to our more general conditions and to our alternative procedures (see [22J) . However, it is also possible to eliminate actions only temporarily. Based on an idea of Hastings (see [7J) , this has been established in [8J for finite actions, finite state discounted Markov decision problems. This will be demonstrated for our situation in section 6 (an example will be included).
Finally, in section 7, all these features are reconsidered for Markov games.
It appears that all the ideas allow some sort of generalization to the zero-sum game situation. A strjking point is that the standard successive approximations approach for Markov games is older than the analogous (but actually more specific) approach for Markov decision processes (see Shapley [38J) . For Markov games the MacQueen bounds have been introduced in [40J by van der Wal. In the same paper the stopping time approach for introducing alternative procedures has been given. The more general convergence conditions have been g1ven 1n [45J; Further generalizations of the conditionsviz. to noncountable state spaces-may be found in the papers [2] , [3J by Couwenbergh. The value oriented approach has been given in [41J again by van der Wal. The elimination of suboptimal actions has been treated in [34] .
For a partial survey of these results (together with some other topics) we refer to [42] .
Markov decision processes with unbounded rewards
We will first introduce our Markov decision process.
A system is observed at discrete points of time (t :; 0,1,2, ••• ). The state of the system at any time t is an element of the countable state space S:-{1,2, ••• }. If at time t the state of the system is i E S, an action a may be chosen from a given arbitrary set A, which incurs a reward r(i,a). The current state i at time t and the action a determine the probability pa(i,j) of observing the system in state J at time t + 1 (regardless of the earlier history of the process). We suppose l pa(i,j) ~ 1 for all 1 E S, a € A. jES Hence a positive probability for fading of the system is allowed.
A policy f is a map from S into A. A strategy ~ is a sequence of policies: ~:;(fO,fl"")' If strategy ~ is used, we choose action ft(i) when the system is in state i at time t. The set of all policies is denoted by F, the set of all strategies by M. A stationary strategy consists of equal policies ~ = (f,f, •.• ), so we actually may use the terms policy and stationary strategy deliberately.
As optimality criterion we choose total expected rewards, which is defined (if the sum converges absolutely) for a strategy ~ :
where r(f) is the column vector with i-th component r(i,f(i»,] P(f) is the matrix with (i,j)~component pf(i)(i,j) and empty products of matrices are equal to the identity matrix I. Matrix products, matrix-vector products and sums of vectors are defined in the usual way. Hence v(~) is a column vector with i-th component: the total expected rewards under stragey ~, if the process starts in i.
-5 -Remarks:
a. Actually, we only introduced the so-called nonrandomized Markov strategies.
It would be very well possible to work with more general types of strategies allowing e.g. actions based on the complete history of the process and mixing of actions. However, under the convergence conditions we need anyhow for our theory it is noJ necessary to consider these more complicated strategies. This can be proved easily using a basic theorem of van Hee (see [9J) , as has been demonstrated in [25J for a somewhat more general situation than we have in this:paper.
b. This set-up contains (semi)-Markov decision processes with discounting, since the resulting discount factors may be incorporated in the transition ~ probabilities. This approach leads to the fact that probabilities not necessarily sum to one, as mentioned in the beginning of this section (see e.g. [22J section 9.1).
Supposing for the moment that v(n) is properly defined for all strategies I n E M, we may state the aim of the decision maker:
. * f~nd n E M, such that * v(TI ) = sup v(n) =: v, TIEM o 0 or, if the sup is not attained, a n is asked for such that v(n )
approximates v ~n some sense.
The key to the solution of this problem is the so-called optimality equation We will first introduce the assumptions on the transition probabilities and the rewards. Therefore we assume a positive function ~ on S to be given (~ and ~-1, the function with values ~-l(i), will also be interpreted as column vectors). Let W be the Banach space of vectors w In section 3 we will consider the question in what situations a function j.l exists such that (i), (ii) and (iii) hold. For the moment we will take these assumptions for granted. Note that p and p+ in the assumptions are not necessarily equal. From these assumptions it follows not only that P(f) is a properly defined operator on W, but also that P(f) is monotone and contracting on W with contrac tion radius II P (f) II :$ P + < I. The proof of lemma 2.2 (iv) exhibited above actually shows more, viz.
the existence of an E-optimal stationary strategy (IIv(f) -vii ~ E) for any positive E. If the sup in the optimality equation is attained * by some f for u = v, then E can be taken zero and the stationary strategy f * is optimal.
n Since T is contracting with contraction radius y, T u converges to v geometrically. This can be used to give upper and lowerbounds for v based on Tnu. However, using the actual convergence of the iterates rnu much better bounds can be given without much extra work. These bounds are based on the following properties:
Proof: The proof of (ii) is similar, but simpler, as the proof of (i) which will be sketched:
Taking the Umit for n -+ <Xl we obtain the required inequality.
These properties make it possible to construct an algorithm which generates 
If 0 satisfies 0 < a(I -p ) for some chosen a > 0, then the upper and lower + bound will differ at most a).l for some finite n. For details see [43J, [22J,[25J. 3. Analysis of the assumptions
We will first make some miscellaneous remarks on the assumptions. is not essential. It only makes a definition of the sequence u(n) possible such that this sequence is nondecreasing. Here and in later variants we only require this mono tonicity for reasons of elegance and -in some cases -simplicity of the proofs.
In the sequel of this section we will discuss the assumptions of section 2, so in this part we will not presuppose them.
Our assumption (ii) requires some sort of transient behaviour of the process involved. Assumption (ii) may be written as for all f ~ F, with p < 1.
+
In this form the function ~ is clearly required to satisfy some sort of strong ~ excessivity property (for excessive functions in Markov decision theory see Hordijk's monograph [15J) . If such a strongly excessive and positive function ~ exists, we will call the Markov decision problem strongly excessive.
•
In the following lemmas we demonstrate the relation between strong excessiveness and the transient behaviour of the process. In order to do so, we denote by P~(.) the probability of some event given that the strategy ~ is used and ~ the process starts in i. X t denotes the random variable indicating the state of the system at time t. So X t E S denotes that the system is still "alive lf (has not faded) at time t. There is a close relation between strong excessivity and so-called N-stage contraction. The following lemma (see [12J) even shows more, viz. if the spectral radius of the Markov decision process with respect to some norm ~ is less than one, then the process is strongly excessive: The proof of lemma 3.4 1.S relatively complicated. If we do not require the new norm~' to be of the weighted supremum norm type, but content ourselves with contractingness with respect to an arbitrary norm, then a similar statement is much easier to prove (see [28J).
Stopping times and success~ve approximation methods
As mentioned in the introduction we will present alternative ways for generating sequences like {u(n)} at the end of section 2. These alternatives for the so called policy improvement step amount to replacement of the operators L(f) -and hence T -by alternative ones. The alternative operators will be defined by stopping times.
Actually, several variants of the policy improvement step are well known.
E.g. a Gauss-Seidel procedure (see Hastings[6J or Kushner and Kleinmann [17J) , an overrelaxation procedure (see Reetz [33J or Schellhaas [37J) and til not be replaced by the supremum over the stationary strategies only (see [22J) .
From now on we will restrict ourselves to transition memoryless stopping times. For the operator T on U we then have the following properties Actually, this stopping time approach might give a possibility of weakening conditions for convergence of successive approximations. Namely, if for II some T the operator T is N-stage contracting, then there will be convergence T in norm of Tnu to v. Whether this idea actually gives a real weakening of T the conditions or not, has not been investigated so far.
Value oriented methods
In this section we will introduce another acceleration technique. As has been said already in the introduction, it will consist of better approximation
of v(f ) in the n-th step of the procedure. On the other hand one has u(n) ~ Tn u(O), where the right hand side tends (n)
T .
to v for n -+ "". Therefore u -+ v when n -+ 00. Moreover
In the same way as in section 2 and 4, one may obtain efficient bounds. As an example we give the upper bound for v:
T u (n) _ u (n)11 1:
• 11
where the only remarkable point is, that the extrapolation is not based on u(n+l) -u(n), but on T u(n) _ u(n).
T It should be remarked that the restriction to finite values of A is not essential. If we interpret L:(f)u as lim L~(f)~, then all properties of our nvalue oriented methods also hold for A = 00. co However, L (f)u = v(f), which implies that for A = ()() we obtain the following This means, that for A = 00 we have a policy iteration procedure.
Namely, for l' 1 this results in the standard policy iteration procedure 
Elimination of non-optimal actions
The final work saving idea which will be presented in this paper, is the elimination of actions which are clearly not optimal. If such an elimination can be executed without much extra work, then it will save work, since the amount of work in the policy improvement step heavily depends on the number of available actions. We will present the action-elimination algorithm for the standard successive approximations procedure (i.e. l' = 1, A = 1), however the more general case may be treated in the same way.
For simplicity of notations we will also suppose that the supremum in the operator T ~s attained, so 0 can be taken zero. Now consider the algorithm of section 2 (with C = 0), which produces a monotone nondecreasing sequence { (n)}oo (n) (n-I) u ncO' Suppose for some n we have u = u, u = w, then we have the following lower bound for u(n+l) = Tu(n) = Tu: u + p II u -wll::. lJ ~ Tu,
• -18where p = inf P f • This can be proved with the same trick as in the first step f of the proof of lemma 2.3 (i).
For an arbitrary f we find the following bound for L(f)u with the analogous trick: 
Harkov games
Host of the ideas explained in the preceding sections can be extended to so called Markov games. Actually, as stated in the introduction, the basic dynamic programming approach for Markov games is older than the similar approach for Markov decision processes (see Shapley [38J) . However, the refinements as presented in this paper have been developed first for Markov decision processes. Most refinements can be generalized in a simple way to Markov games. At least, after the generalization has been found, it appears to be simple.
In this section we will give a short introduction to Markov games and demonstrate how the ideas of the preceding section can be applied.
~ 7.1. Markov games with unbounded rewards
We now consider a system as in section 2, however, two players may choose at any time t = 0,1,2, ••• actions a and b from sets A and B after having observed the state i of the system. These (independently made) choices determine the immediate reward r(i,a,b) for the first player (choosing from A); this reward has to be paid by the second player (choosing from B).
Another result of these choices is a state transition which will result in state j with probability pa,b(i,j).
The conditions have to be stronger than in section 2 with respect to the action spaces. For simplicity we suppose here that A and B are finite.
For more general cases see Couwenbergh [2J, [3J and the survey paper of Parthasarathy and Stern [29J. In all generalizations there are compactness ~ requirements for A and B. Again we only introduce Markov strategies, since it can be proved that more general strategies can be discarded (see e.g.
[2J, [3J, [40J,[42] , [45J) . However, we need randomized Markov strategies.
So we call f a policy for the first player if f(i) is a probability distribution on A: fa(i) ~ 0, 1 fa(i) = 1. Similarly a policy g for the aEA second player is defined as a probability distribution on B. Strategies for the players are sequences of policies: n = (f O ,f 1 , ••• ) for the first player and p = (gO,gl"") for the second player. Now the total expected reward v(n,p) fo·r the first player (= costs for the second player if they play the strategies n,p is defined as: Furthermore, one is interested in finding the value of v(n*,p*), which will be denoted by v and called: the value of the game, n* and p* will be called optimal strategies.
Similarly as in section 2, the key to the solution is the fact that v = u and f , g such that n n L(f,g ) u(n-l) ~ u(n) = Qu(n-I) = L(f ,g ) u(n-l) ~ L(f ,g) u (n-l) n n n n Again u(n) and u(n-l) may be used for the computation of simple but efficient upper and lower bounds for v and v(f ,g ). Because of the similarity with n n section 2 we will skip this (see e.g. [42J). moreover, we have here the ~ simpler situation that the sup and inf in Q are always attained.
The results of section 3 apply completely to the Markov game situation, since the lemmas 3. 1 -3.4 in fact only require a set of transition matrices with the property that any combination of rows from some of the allowed matrices forms again an allowed matrix (see [12J) . Again, we obtain for nonzero transition memoryless stopping times T, that U (n) = Q u(n-l)
.
. produces a proper successive approX1mat10ns method. For T details see van der Wal [40J.
Value oriented methods for Markov games
The value oriented methods for Markov decision processes as introduced in section 5 contain policy iteration methods as extreme cases (A = 00). For Markov games the standard (. = 1) extension of the policy iteration method has been suggested by Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak [30J. They give a convergence proof under fairly strong conditions and only conjecture the convergence under milder conditions. A mare general proof of Rao, Chandrasekaran.and Nair [32J appeared to be incorrect as has been demonstrated by van der Wal in a forthcoming paper [41J. Actually, a simple example (see [41J or [42J) shows that the algorithm may start cycling.
Hence the straightforward generalization of the policy iteration method to Markov games is riot feasible in general. However, an idea of Hoffman and Karp [14J for average reward games can be applied here as has also been suggested by Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak [30J. Van der Wal [41J has used this set up for the construction of value oriented methods for Markov games. The case T 1, A = 1 represents the standard successive approximations method; arbitrary T, A = represents the methods of subsection 7.2; • = 1, A = 00 represents the policy iteration method as introduced by
Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak according to the idea of Hoffman and Karp.
Here, we describe the method for fixed. and A: Having the formulation of this procedure, the convergence proof is very similar to the proof for Markov decision processes (see [41J) . Also the Jtopping criteria and the bounds for v and v(f ,g ) are completely similar n n (see [41J, [42J,[45J) .
Elimination of nonoptimal actions
As in section 6 we restrict attention to the standard successive approximation method (T = 1, A = 1). Then an action at is nonoptimal at stage n in state i, if any policy f(i) being optimal for the matrix game r(i,a,b) + I pa,b(~,j)u(n)(j) satisfies fat (i) = o. j n This gives the possibility to eliminate some actions for both players in some states for one iteration step. This can be executed completely similar to the procedure presented for Markov decision processes (section 6) using the upper and lower bounds which have not been stated explicity in sub section 7.1. Such a procedure has been worked out in detail by Reetz and van der Wal in [34J. It will be self-evident that the same idea may be used to eliminate actions ~or m steps (see [34J) •
